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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Crop Insurance-Adequacy of Notice
In a recent United States Supreme Court case1 the plaintiff, an
Idaho farmer, sued the Federal. Crop Insurance Corporation2 to recover
1 Federal Corp. Ins. Corporation v. Merrill,--U. S.-, 68 Sup. Ct. 1, 92 L. Ed.
51 (1947), reversing 174 P. 2d 834 (Idaho 1946).
252 STAT. 72 (1938), 7 U. S. C. §1503 (1940).
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for the destruction of his spring wheat crop by drought. In applying
for the insurance the plaintiff had informed the Corporation's local
agent that he was reseeding 400 acres of his spring wheat on winter
wheat acreage, and the agent had advised him that his entire crop was
insurable. After the drought the Federal Crop Insurance Corpora-
tion.refused to pay the loss because, prior to the plaintiff's application,
the Corporation had promulgated its Wheat Crop Insurance Regula-
tions which were duly published in the Federal'Register. 3 The regula-
tions stated that spring wheat which had been reseeded on winter wheat
was not insurable. The Court held in a five to four decision that the
plaintiff could not recover.
The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation is expressly given the
power to sue and be sued.4 If this had meant that the Corporation was
to be held subject to the same rules of liability as private insurance com-
panies, then it would have been liable in this case. Under the insurance
law of Idaho, and the majority of states6 the knowledge of the agent
is the knowledge of the company and his representations in a situation
like the present one would bind the company. However, the Court did
not apply this rule because to have done so would have been to ignore
the regulations promulgated by the Corporation and published in the
Federal Register.
Prior to the Federal Register Act of 19357 there was no uniform
or systematic method of publicizing executive orders or administrative
regulations. The great confusion that this led to was strikingly empha-
sized in the case of Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan5 where the case was
argued through two lower courts upon the assumption that the Petro-
leum Code contained a paragraph which in fact had been eliminated'by
executive order. To correct this difficulty an act was passed requiring
all executive orders and administrative regulations 9 of general applica-
'Wheat Crop Insurance Regulations 414-37(v), 10 FE. Rwo. 1591 (1945).
'52 STAT. 73 (1938), 7 U. S. C. §1506(d) (1940). This section provides that
the Federal Crop Insurance Corp. shall not be subject to garnishment, attachment,
or injunction.
aMaybee v. Continental Casualty Co., 37 Idaho 667, 219 Pac. 598 (1923);
Carroll v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 28 Idaho 466, 154 Pac. 985 (1916).
E. g., Triple Link Mutual Indemnity Ass'n v. Williams, 121 Ala. 138, 26 So.
19 (1899); Commercial Credit Co. v. Eisenhour, 28 Ariz. 112, 236 Pac. 126
(1925) ; Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore, 154 Ky. 18, 156 S. W. 867 (1913) ;
Crossman v. American Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J., 198 Mich. 304, 164 N. W. 428
(1917) ; Cox v. Assurance Society, 209 N. C. 778, 185 S. E. 12 (1936) ; Steuer-
nagel v. Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum, 234 N. Y. 251, 137 N. E. 320 (1922).
749 STAT. 500 (1935), 44 U. S. C. §§301-314 (1940).
8293 U. S. 388, 412 (1935).
O Section 5 of the Federal Register Act requires specifically the publication of
presidential proclamations and executive orders, such other documents as the presi-
dent may determine, and such documents as Congress may determine. Under this
section the president issues regulations requiring the rules of administrative agen-
cies to be published. See Ronald, Publication of Federal Administrative Legiska-
lion, 7 GEo. W. L. REv. 51, 71 (1938). The Federal Administrative Procedure
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bility and legal effect to be published in the Federal Register. Accord-
ing to the Act filing of the regulation with the Division of the National
Archives Establishment is sufficient to give notice of its contents to the
public. 10 The cases'1 involving the point have held, with one excep-
tion,' 2 that publication in the Federal Register does give notice to in-
terested parties. Thus the Court in the principal case held that publi-
cation of the Corporation's regulations in the Federal Register gave legal
notice of their contents, and they were binding on the plaintiff though
neither he nor the Corporation's local agent had actual knowledge of
them.
The question then arises as to whether a government corporation
which engages in commercial activity should be held subject to the same
rules of law as to its liability as a private corporation similarly situated.
As a matter of public policy a strong argument can be made that it
should not. Government corporations are not on the same basis as
private ones in that their purpose is not to make profit but rather to
procure benefits which inure to the public generally. In the principal
case, for instance, it was pointed out that all-risk crop insurance had
been too great a commercial hazard for private insurance companies, so
the government entered the field to give the farmers much needed
protection.' 3
However, the benefits which the government corporations are giving
the public would seem to be somewhat illusory when these corporations
are allowed to escape liability in situations where private corporations
would be held. Such cases may tend to create distrust of government
corporations. The courts have tended, in the absence of express con-
Act, 60 STAT. 238 (1946), 5 U. S. C. AiP. §1002(a) (Supp. 1947), supplements
this and requires all substantive rules and statements of policy of administrative
agencies to be published in the Federal Register.
10 Publication in the Federal Register would seem to afford interested persons
substantially the same opportunity to acquaint themselves with pertinent adminis-
trative regulation as they would have to acquaint themselves with pertinent statutes
passed by Congress. However, to the effect that even lawyers seldom have access
to or know how to use the Federal Register, see Wigmore, The Federal Register
and Code of Federal Regulations, 29 A. B. A. Joui. 10 (1943); 22 MicH. ST. B.
Joup. 23 (1943).1' Flannagan v. United States, 145 F. 2d 740 (C. C. A. 9th 1944) ; Henderson
v. Baldwin, 54 F. Supp. 438 (D. C. Pa. 1942); Henderson v. Nixon, 66 Idaho
780, 168 P. 2d 594 (1946).
"2 Hall v. Chaltis, 31 A. 2d 699 (D. C. Mun. App. 1943). In this case it was
held that a price regulation filed two days before and published on the day that
defendant made the sale at a price above that required by the regulation did not
give sufficient notice to defendant to render him liable to a $5D penalty. A con-
curring opinion said of the Federal Register, "I think we can take judicial notice
that the average shopkeeper does not see that publication and probably is unaware
that such a publication exists."
I See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CROP
INSURANcE, H. Doc. No. 150, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4, 11-12; H. RE'. No. 1479,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2; 81 CoNG. R= 2866, 2867, 2887, 2891, 2893, 2895 (1937).
[Vol. 26
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gressional intent to the contrary, to treat them as private corporations.14
This view was well stated in United States v. Thomas15 where the court
said, "In commercial transactions the Government should require of no
citizen adherence to a rule between men that it is unwilling to follow."
Examples of the courts denying government corporations 18 the
privileges and immunities usually afforded the Government itself are
numerous. Thus government corporations may be sued without their
consent1 7 even where Congress has not authorized suit against them.' s
They are liable for interest' 9 and court costs.2 0 Their actions have
been held to be barred by statutes of limitations and laches. 21 It has
1" Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations, 21 VA. L. Ray. 465, 503
(1935), where the author says "in the law of government proprietary corporations
the public interest is best served by regarding them as private."
1 27 F. Supp. 433 (N. D. Tex. 1939).
10 There are two principal types of government corporations, those which are
incorporated directly by an act of Congress and those which are incorporated
under the law of some state pursuant to an act of Congress. However, it is be-
lieved that the general principles applicable to one are applicable to the other. For
an opinion that there is no distinction to be drawn between the two types see,
Coffman, Legal Status of Government Corporations, 7 FED. B. J. 389 n.* (1936).
The Government Corporations Control Act, 59 STAT. 597, 602 (1945), 31 U. S. C.
App. §869 (Supp. 1947) provides that government corporations must be created
directly by act of Congress and any existing corporations chartered under state
law must be reincorporated by act of Congress before June 30, 1948.
1' Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U. S. 381
(1939); Olson v. United States Spruce Production Corporation, 267 U. S. 462
(1925); Sloan Shipping Corp. v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet
Corporation, 258 U. S. 549 (1922) ; Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. United States
Sugar Eq. Board, 268 Fed. 575 (S. D. N. Y. 1920) ; cf. Bank of the United States
v. Planter's Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. 904 (U. S. 1824).
18 In creating corporations Congress has almost uniformly included "sue and be
sued" clauses. E.g., Farmer's Home Corporation, 50 STAT. 527 (1937), 7 U. S. C.
§1014 (1940); Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, 48 STAT. 1246,
1256 (1934), 12 U. S. C. § 1725 (1940); Home Owner's Loan Corporation, 48
STAT. 128, 129 (1933), 12 U. S. C. §1463 (1940) ; Tennessee Valley Authority, 48
STAT. 58, 60 (1933), 16 U. S. C. §831 (1940) ; Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
47 STAT. 5, 6 (1932), 15 U. S. C. §604 (1940); Inland Waterways Corporation,
43 STAT. 360, 362 (1924), 49 U. S. C. §155 (1940) ; National Agricultural Credit
Corporation, 42 STAT. 1454, 1462 (1923), 12 U. S. C. §1171 (1940) ; Foreign Bank-
ing Corporations, 41 STAT. 378 (1919), 12 U. S. C. §614 (1940).
" Utlited States v. The Thekla, 266 U. S. 328 (1924); National Home For
Disabled Volunteer Soldiers v. Parrish, 229 U. S. 494 (1913) ; accord, Standard
Oil Company v. United States, 267 U. S. 76 (1925) (interest allowed against
United States on a policy of war risk insurance, though not administered by a
government corporation. The court, per Holmes, said, "When the United States
went into the insurance business, issued policies in familiar form and provided that
in case of disagreement it might be sued, it must be assumed to have accepted the
ordinary incidents of suits in such business.").
-o Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 312 U. S. 81
(1941); see Walling v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 162 F. 2d 95, 97 (C. C. A. 4th
1947).
" Lindgren v. United States Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corp., 55 F. 2d
117 (C. C. A. 4th 1932) ; The No. 34, 11 F. 2d 287 (C. C. A. 2d 1925) ; Bank of
the United States v. McKenzie, 2 Fed. Cas. 718, No. 927 (C. C. Va. 1829) ; see
United States v. Morse, 26 F. Supp. 341, 342 (S. D. Me. 1939). But cf. Davis
v. Corona Coal Co., 265 U. S. 219 (1924).
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been held that government corporations can be estopped.22 They are
liable for their torts.23 Some courts have held that they are subject to
garnishment and attachment.
2 4
In holding government corporations liable in situations where the
Government itself would be immune, many courts merely say that the
corporation is a separate and distinct entity2-5 or that the Government
in becoming a corporation and descending to the level of the business
world divests itself of its sovereignty.20 The more recent view on
liability is that it is a matter of congressional intent.27 Congress may
clothe the corporation with the Government's immunity.2 8 Whether
or not it has done so must be determined by considering the statute
creating the corporation and the nature and purposes of the corporation
created.29
Thus the question in the principal case would be: did Congress
intend the law of private insurance companies to be bodily applicable
to the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation? That Congress authorized
the Government to enter into a commercial field, that it chose a corporate
form to administer the insurance,3 0 and that it gave it power to sue
2' Providence Engineering Corporation v. Downey Shipbuilding Corporation, 294
Fed. 641 (C. C. A. 2d 1923); see The Falcon, 19 F. 2d 1009, 1014 (D. C. Md.
1927) ; cf. Cushman v. United States, 43 F. Supp. 810 (S. D. Cal. 1942).
23Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U. S. 381
(1939) ; Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375 (1924) ; Sloan Shipyard
Corp. v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, 258 U. S.
549 (1922); Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization
Board, 268 Fed. 575 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).
24 Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229 (1935) ; Commonwealth Finance
Corporation v. Landis, 261 Fed. 440 (E. D. Pa. 1919) ; Central Market v. King, 132
Neb. 380, 272 N. W. 244 (1937) ; Gill v. Reese, 53 Ohio App. 134, 4 N. E. 2d 273
(1936) ; Haines v. Lone Star Shipbuilding Co., 268 Pa. 92, 110 At. 788 (1920) ;
cf. Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242 (1939). Contra:
McCarthy v. United States Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corporation, 53 F. 2d
923 (App. D. C. 1931); Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. Hardie & Caudle,
171 Tenn. 43, 100 S. W. 2d 238 (1936).
2 See, e.g., Olson v. United States Spruce Production Corporation, 267 U. S.
462, 467 (1924) ; National Home For Disabled Volunteer Soldiers v. Parrish, 229
U. S. 494, 496 (1913) ; Bank of the United States v. Planter's Bank of .Georgia,
9 Wheat. 904, 907 (U. S. 1824) ; Lindgren v. United States Shipping Board Mer-
chant Fleet Corporation, 55 F. 2d 117, 120 (C. C. A. 4th 1932).
"0 Bank of the United States v. Planters Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. 904, 907
(U. S. 1824).
' Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 312 U. S. 81
(1941) ; Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U. S. 381
(1939); Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229 (1935); Sloan Shipyard
Corporation v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, 258
U. S. 549 (1922); cf. Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242
(1959).
" See Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 312 U. S.
81, 84 (1941) ; Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U. S.
381, 389 (1939) ; Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229, 231 (1935).
" See note 27 supra.
" Not all government insurance is handled by government corporations. Na-
tional Service Life Insurance is administered by the Administrator of Veterans'
Affairs and payment is made from a fund in the Treasury. 54 STAT. 1008, 1012
[Vol. 26
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and be sued would seem to indicate that it intended the Corporation to
be subject to the same rules.of law as private insurance companies. The
Supreme Court could have avoided the effect of the Corporation's Wheat
Crop Insurance Regulations in the same manner as did the Idaho Su-
preme Court.3 ' That court said that Congress did not intend such regu-
lations to be binding law but merely rules for the Corporation's own
guidance and for the guidance of its agents. However, the Court did
not find that Congress intended the law of private insurance companies
to be applicable to the Corporation.
In the future, if goyernment corporations which are engaging in
commercial activities are to be held amenable-to the same rules of law
as private corporations -Congress must clearly manifest that intention
in the statutes creating them.
WILLrAM T. JOYNER, JR.
Adoption-Invalidation for Want of Consent
In Allen v. Morgan,' the Court of Appeals of Georgia upheld the
action of the trial court in denying plaintiff's petition for adoption of
defendants' child, and vacating the interlocutory order of adoption
granted eight months prior to entry'of the judgment.
The defendants were married after conception but before birth of
the child. On learning of this the husband's step-mother began to
apply pressure to have the child adopted. The defendants testified that
the step-mother "suggested" that the mother go to a waiting home and
put the child out for adoption, in order that the step-mother could hold
*up both "her head" and "her social standing." One month after its
birth they took the child to Saluda, North Carolina and left it in the
care of a doctor, until the defendants "could get situated." Three days
later the defendants signed the consent, "because of the constant pres-
sure being put on us day and night." The plaintiffs were residents of
Georgia and were qualified in every way to become adoptive parents.
Neither they nor their attorney had knowledge of any coercion that
might have been practiced on the defendants.
The court, in construing the statute2 requiring consent of the natu-
ral parents, held that both the letter and spirit of the statute gives the
court, "full and unrestricted power to examine into the nature and kind
of consent by parents to an adoption, not only because it is absolutely
(1940), 38 U. S. C. §§801, 805 (1940). The War Risk Insurance of the First
World War was administered by the Bureau of War Risk Insurance in the Treas-
ury Department. 40 STAr. 398 (1917).
"Merrill v. Federal Crop Ins. Corporation, 174 P. 2d 834 (Idaho 1946).
144 S. E. 2d 500 (Ga. 1947).
2GA. CODE ANN. (Harrison, 1937) §74-403 (Supp. 1945) "... no adoption
shall be permitted except with the written consent of the living parents of the
child,.. :'
19481
